Terry B. Cogan v. Linda S. Cogan : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Terry B. Cogan v. Linda S. Cogan : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall J. Holmgren; Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent.
Wendell P. Ables; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cogan v. Cogan, No. 890060 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1558
V § i 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10
 O Q 
DOCKET NO. Y>i-nn(rfi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TERRY B. COGAN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LINDA S. COGAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
No. 890060-CA 
f ncriW & 15. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE HOMER WILKINSON, JUDGE 
DEPOSITED BY THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUG 17 1990 
Randall J. Holmgren 
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorney for Respondent 
Wendall Abies 
53 6 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
JUL 31989 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TERRY B. COGAN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LINDA S. COGAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
No. 890060-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE HOMER WILKINSON, JUDGE 
Randall J. Holmgren 
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorney for Respondent 
Wendall Abies 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTION 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
B. Disposition in the Lower Court 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
1. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE BARRED FROM RAISING THE 
"MINIMUM CONTACT" ARGUMENT ON APPEAL. 
DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THAT ARGUMENT AT ANY 
STAGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DID NOT RAISE THE ARGUMENT IN HER DOCKETING 
STATEMENT OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION. 
CONSEQUENTLY, ON APPEAL THE DEFENDANT CANNOT 
UTILIZE SUCH "NEW" THEORY IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED. 
2. NOTWITHSTANDING ARGUMENT "1" ABOVE, THE STATE 
OF UTAH DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
OVER PLAINTIFF. THEREFORE, UTAH CANNOT IMPOSE 
"NEW" FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS UPON PLAINTIFF. 
3. NOTWITHSTANDING ARGUMENT "1" ABOVE, THE 
"CONTACTS" ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT ARE NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE UTAH A BASIS FOR PERSONAL 
1. 
JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF — A RESIDENT OF NEW 
MEXICO. 
10 
4. THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT DOES NOT APPLY 
IN THE PRESENT CASE TO PROVIDE UTAH A BASIS FOR 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF. 
18 
5. PLAINTIFF, NOT DEFENDANT, IS ENTITLED TO AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
21 
CONCLUSION 22 
ADDENDUM 2 4 
ii. 
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Paqe(s) 
Blue Ball Properties. Inc.. v. McClain. 
658 F.Supp. 1310 (D. Del. 1987) 18 
Bradford v. Naale. 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988) 18,19 
Davis v. Mulholland. 475 P.2d 835 (Utah 1970) 8 
First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State 
University. 544 P.2d 887, 892 (Utah 1975) 7,8 
Gaqner v. Parsons & Whittemore. Inc., 
450 F.Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 18 
Hanson v. Denkla. 375 U.S. 235 (1958) 11,12,13,14,18 
In re Hazen and Henderson,. 702 P.2d 1143 
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) 15,16 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) 7 
Johansen v. Johansen. 305 N.W.2d 383 (S.D. 1981) 14,15 
Koster v. Automark Indus.. Inc.. 640 F.2d 77, 
79 (7th Cir. 1981) 18 
Kulko v. Superior Court of California. 
436 U.S. 84 (1978) 13,14,15,16 
Rekward v. Indus. Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166, 168 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 7 
Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186 (1977) 14 
Simpson v. General Motors Corp.. 470 P.2d 399 
(Utah 1970) 8 
iii. 
Stuber v. Stuber. 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 
(1952) 21 
Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 7 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2)(h) (1988) 1 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann., §78-22a-l 
to 78-22a-8 (1988) 3 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24 (1988) 10 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1988) 22 
COURT RULES CITED 
Rules of Utah Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3(a) (1988) 1 
iv. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TERRY B. COGAN, ] 
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vs. 
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Defendant/Appellant. 
i N o . 890060-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is authorized by Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3 (2) (h) (1988) and Rules of Utah Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3(a) 
(1988) to hear this appeal (domestic relations case) from the Third 
District Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order dismissing Defendant's 
Petition for Modification [of Divorce] (Record at 6) and Amended 
Petition for Modification [of Divorce] (Record at 64). Defendant 
appealed (Record at 83). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Defendant/Appellant has raised the following issues on 
appeal: 
1. Whether Defendant/Appellant can bring a petition for 
modification and/or enforcement of a New Mexico Decree of Divorce 
filed in Utah pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
2. Whether Defendant/Appellant is entitled to an award to 
[sic] attorney's fees on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Defendant instituted this action by 
filing a "Pcatition for Modification" against Plaintiff on or about 
October 13, 1988 (Record at 6) and an "Amended Petition for 
2 
Modification" on or about January 13, 1989 (Record at 64).1 In the 
"Amended Petition" Defendant alleged: 
a) That the parties1 divorce decree was entered in the State 
of New Mexico in 1987. (Record at 64). 
b) That Defendant had moved from New Mexico to Utah with the 
parties' two minor children. (Record at 64).2 
c) That Defendant filed a copy of the New Mexico divorce 
decree with the clerk of the district court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22a-l (1988) . (Record at 64) . 
The record is somewhat confusing concerning whether 
Defendant's "Amended Petition for Modification" was on file when 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss was argued to the District Court on 
December 2, 1988 (Record at 52). It appears from the record that 
the Defendant's "[original] Petition for Modification" was filed 
October 13, 1988 (Record at 6) and her "Amended Petition for 
Modification" was filed on January 13, 1989 (Record at 64) after 
the hearing and Order of Dismissal even though it appears that said 
document was signed by Defendant's counsel on October 28, 1988 
(Record at 68) — before the hearing and Order of Dismissal. For 
the purposes of this appeal, Plaintiff's arguments will refer to 
the "Amended" petition even though it appears from the record that 
said document was not filed with the Court at the time the Motion 
to Dismiss was argued and decided. Plaintiff has reviewed the 
"Petition" and "Amended Petition" and finds that the only changes 
are that Defendant first requested alimony of $20,000 (Record at 
7,9) and in the "Amended Petition" raised her request to $50,000 
(Record at 65,67). 
2
 Defendant implied that she and the children had moved from 
New Mexico to Utah; she states that she and the children are 
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. Prior to said residency, 
Defendant and the children lived in New Mexico with Plaintiff. 
3 
d) That the Utah court should impose an alimony obligation 
against Plaintiff and for Defendant since no alimony provision was 
contained in the New Mexico decree. (Record at 65). 
e) That the Utah court should increase the child support 
obligation contained in the New Mexico decree against Plaintiff and 
for Defendant. (Record at 65, 66). 
f) That the Utah court should impose upon Plaintiff an 
obligation to pay an IRS assessment as a "community indebtedness" 
in accordance with the parties' decree of divorce. (Record at 66) . 
g) That the Utah court should require Plaintiff to pay 
insurance deductibles as required by the parties' decree of 
divorce. (Record at 67). 
Disposition in the Lower Court. Plaintiff moved the Third 
District Court to dismiss Defendant's petition(s). The motion was 
duly briefed and argued to the Court on December 2, 1988. Judge 
Homer Wilkinson granted the motion from the bench (Record at 58, 
59) and the formal Order dismissing Defendant's petition(s) was 
entered December 16, 1988. (Order, Record at 62). Defendant's 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1* Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced in New Mexico on 
January 2, 1987 (Decree, Record at 2-5, 34), and at the time of the 
4 
divorce both parties were residents of New Mexico (Record at 35). 
Defendant never contested these facts in the Utah district court 
proceeding. 
2. Sometime after the entry of the New Mexico decree, 
Defendant moved herself and the parties1 minor children in her 
custody from New Mexico to Utah. (Record at 35). Defendant never 
contested these facts in the Utah district court proceeding. 
3. Plaintiff continues to reside in New Mexico. (Record at 
35). Plaintiff has always resided in New Mexico. (Record at 53). 
Defendant never contested these facts in the Utah district court 
proceeding. 
4* Plaintiff has never had any contacts with the State of 
Utah by which long-arm personal jurisdiction can be based or 
invoked. (Record at 53). Defendant never contested these facts 
in the Utah district court proceeding.3 
5. Plaintiff was personally served with a Summons and 
Petition for Modification on October 19, 1988 within the 
geographical boundaries of the State of New Mexico. (Record at 
3
 At no stage of the proceeding did Defendant or Defendant's 
counsel make any allegation that there was a basis for long-arm 
jurisdiction whereby Utah could obtain personal jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff. Defendant's brief on appeal (Appellant's Brief, p. 7) 
does make an argument that there is sufficient long-arm 
jurisdiction, however, Defendant did not make such an argument at 
any stage of the Utah district court proceeding. 
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35). Defendant never contested these facts in the district court 
proceeding. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant should be barred from raising the "minimum contact" 
argument on appeal. Defendant did not raise that argument at any 
stage of the district court proceedings, and did not raise the 
argument in her docketing statement or motion for summary 
disposition. Consequently, on appeal the Defendant cannot utilize 
such "new" theory in an effort to show that the lower court erred. 
Notwithstanding the argument above, the State of Utah does 
not have personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff. Therefore, Utah 
cannot impose "new" financial obligations upon Plaintiff. Further, 
the "contacts" alleged by Defendant are not sufficient to provide 
Utah a basis for personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff, a resident 
of New Mexico. 
Application of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act in the present 
case does not operate to provide Utah a basis for personal 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff, not Defendant, is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE BARRED FROM RAISING THE 
"MINIMUM CONTACT" ARGUMENT4 ON APPEAL. 
DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THAT ARGUMENT AT ANY 
STAGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DID NOT RAISE THE ARGUMENT IN HER DOCKETING 
STATEMENT OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION. 
CONSEQUENTLY, ON APPEAL THE DEFENDANT CANNOT 
UTILIZE SUCH "NEW" THEORY IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED. 
Appellate courts are courts of review; they review the 
proceedings of the lower court. Review does not include matters 
raised on appeal which were not presented during the lower court 
proceedings. Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Rekward v. Indus. Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) ; James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) ; First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University, 544 
Appellant's brief is organized around two (2) "POINTS.11 The 
first POINT argues that the Plaintiff has sufficient minimum 
contact with Utah such as to form a basis for personal 
jurisdiction; the first POINT then identifies what Appellant 
considers to be seven (7) such minimum contacts; the first POINT 
continues with an argument that such contacts constitute sufficient 
minimum contacts; the first POINT concludes with a discussion of 
the application the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. The second POINT 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 16) argues that Appellant should be awarded 
attorney fees on appeal. 
7 
P.2d 887, 892 (Utah 1975); Davis v. Mulholland. 475 P.2d 835 (Utah 
1970)5. 
In Simpson v. General Motors Corp,, 470 P.2d 399 (Utah 1970), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that the reason the above-stated rule 
is followed in Utah is to maintain orderly procedure in the courts 
with the ultimate purpose being the final settlement of 
controversies. The Court reasoned that a party must present his 
entire case and theory to the trial court and, having done so, he 
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and thus "attempt 
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation." Id. at 401. 
The above-stated Utah rule applies to the present case as 
follows: At the District Court proceeding, Defendant made no 
written or oral argument that Utah had a basis for asserting 
personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff. Defendant entirely avoided 
that argument. Defendant's sole rationale for personal 
Davis sought to recover money he had paid for an option to 
buy land. In support of his request for rescission, his theory at 
trial was "mutual" mistake; on appeal, he added an new reason — 
i.e., "unilateral" mistake. The Supreme Court seemed to disapprove 
of the tactic concluding that even if Davis had presented the 
"unilateral-mistake" theory at trial he could not have prevailed. 
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jurisdiction was her perceived application of the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act.6 
On appeal, Defendant's "Docketing Statement" and "Motion for 
Summary Disposition" and "Memorandum of Points and Authorities" (in 
support of Motion for Summary Disposition) do not include any 
argument that Utah had a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction 
over Plaintiff. Defendant entirely avoided that argument. Again, 
Defendant's sole rational for personal jurisdiction was her 
perceived application of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
Defendant now argues, for the first time (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 7) , that Utah has personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff by virtue 
of several enumerated "minimum contacts." 
Defendant should be barred from raising the "minimum contacts" 
argument on appeal. Defendant did not raise that argument at any 
stage of the Utah District Court proceedings and did not raise the 
argument in her Docketing Statement or Motion for Summary 
Disposition. Consequently, on appeal Defendant cannot utilize such 
"new" theory in an effort to show that the lower court erred. 
6
 See transcript of "Oral Argument and Judge's Bench Ruling" 
(Record at 52) ; "Amended Petition for Modification" (Record at 64) ; 
and "Memorandum of Points and Authorities" (Record at 49). 
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2. NOTWITHSTANDING ARGUMENT "1" ABOVE, THE STATE 
OF UTAH DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
OVER PLAINTIFF. THEREFORE, UTAH CANNOT IMPOSE 
"NEW"7 FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS UPON PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff refers to and incorporates herein the "Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities [et. al.],f which he filed with the Third 
District Court in support of his Motion to Dismiss. (Record at 
34) . 
3. NOTWITHSTANDING ARGUMENT "1" ABOVE, THE 
"CONTACTS" ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT ARE NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE UTAH A BASIS FOR PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF — A RESIDENT OF 
NEW MEXICO. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24 (1988) provides: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102 ... who in 
person or through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself ... to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the 
marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding 
subsequent departure from the state; or the commission 
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so 
long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act, 
or occurrence over which the defendant had no control; 
7
 The parties were divorced in New Mexico and the divorce 
courtfs Decree of Divorce did not require Respondent to pay alimony 
but did require Respondent to pay child support. Appellant then 
moved to Utah and petitioned the Utah Third District Court to order 
Respondent to impose alimony and increase child support (i.e., 
"new" financial obligations). 
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The "long-arm" jurisdiction statute provided above does not 
support Defendant's position on appeal. 
Defendant has not alleged any of the traditional indicia of 
"sufficient minimum contacts."8 
Plaintiff has never resided in the State of Utah. The parties 
never resided in Utah as husband and wife. No "act[s]" giving rise 
to the divorce claim were committed in Utah. Further, no "act[s]fl 
giving rise to the modification claim were committed in Utah. 
Plaintiff has had one (1) contact with Utah in his life. On 
one occasion prior to marrying Defendant, Plaintiff drove through 
Utah on his way to another state. Such a casual, happenstance, and 
chance contact with Utah is both minor, insignificant and 
insufficient to constitute a long-arm jurisdiction "minimum 
contact." Further, it was not done for the purpose of availing 
See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310 (1945) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stated that before a 
state can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant, the defendant must have certain "minimum contacts" with 
the forum such that it does not offend "traditional notions and 
substantial justice" to require the defendant to attend the forum. 
The type of satisfactory contacts were enumerated in Hanson v. 
Denkla, 375 U.S. 235 (1958) where the Supreme Court said that it 
was essential that in each case there be some contact by which the 
"defendant purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and 
protection of its laws." Id. In other words, the contact has to 
be voluntary and the contact with the state has to be for the 
purpose of providing some sort of meaningful benefit to the 
defendant such that the state is owed jurisdiction over his person. 
11 
Plaintiff "of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws." 
Hanson at 235. 
Notwithstanding argument "I11 above, Plaintiff now addresses 
the "minimum contacts" alleged by Defendant. 
Contact l:9 Defendant claims that the parties1 divorce was 
obtained in New Mexico by Plaintiff. 
While that is true, it has nothing to do with Plaintiff having 
a contact with Utah. 
Defendant also argues that if Utah awards alimony to 
Defendant, she will not become a public charge in Utah. 
Again, that has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a contact 
with Utah. 
Contact 2:10 Defendant claims that Plaintiff erroneously 
prepared the parties1 1985 tax return which lead to an assessment 
by the IRS against Defendant. 
That claim has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a contact 
with Utah. To say that Plaintiff, while domiciled in the state of 
New Mexico with his family in 1985, "purposely availed himself of 
Appellantfs Brief, p. 10. 
10
 id . 
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the privilege of conducting activities within [Utah]" (See Hanson 
at 235) by allegedly preparing a tax return, is not a reasonable 
conclusion; it does not comport with what a sufficient minimum 
contact is. Plaintiff received no benefit from the state of Utah 
by preparing his federal tax return in New Mexico or by filing it. 
Defendant further claims that she has been caused financial 
hardship. That claim is merely an issue going to the merits of 
Defendant's claim for modification of the divorce. 
Contact 3;11 Defendant claims that the parties1 minor children 
have moved to Utah and reside in Utah with Defendant and attend 
public schools in Utah. 
That claim does not, as a matter of law, constitute a 
sufficient minimum contact. In Kulko v. Superior Court of 
California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), a New York man permitted his minor 
daughter to move to California to live with his ex-wife, the 
child's mother. By doing so, he did not purposely avail himself 
of any benefits or protection of California law. The Court found 
that: 
We cannot accept the proposition that [the father's] 
acquiescence in [the daughter's] desire to live with her 
mother in [the non-marital state] conferred jurisdiction 
over [the father] in the [non-marital state]. A father 
who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his 
children's preferences, to allow them [sic] to spend more 
11
 Id. 
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time in [the non-marital state] than was required under 
a separation agreement can hardly be said to have 
'purposefully availed himself1 of the 'benefits and 
protections1 of [the non-marital state's] laws. (Citing 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S., at 216.12 
Accordingly, California did not have personal jurisdiction 
over the man.13 
In the present action, to say that Plaintiff acquiesced in his 
children moving from New Mexico to Utah with Defendant is not to 
say that he "purposely availed himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within [Utah]11 or that he thereby "[invoked] 
the benefit and protection of its laws." See Hanson at 235. 
Plaintiff's supposed contact is too remote and too far removed to 
amount to a sufficient minimum contact with Utah. 
Defendant cites (Appellant's Brief, p. 13) Johansen v. 
Johansen, 305 N.W. 2d 383 (S.D. 1981) for the proposition that a 
state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident father 
where he purposefully failed to support his minor child, and where 
his wrongful conduct "tipfped] the scales of fair play and 
Footnote 7 at page 94 of Kulko states that though services 
(e.g., police and fire protection) were provided to the child by 
the non-marital state (California), the services were essentially 
benefits to the child, and in any event were not benefits that the 
father purposefully sought for himself. 
Appellant's brief (p. 15) cites the dissent in Kulko, 
however such dissenting opinion does not have stare decisis effect. 
14 
substantial justice decidedly in the favor of sustaining 
jurisdiction. Id. at 387. 
In the present case, Plaintiff is current paying his child 
support obligation and no arrearage has been alleged. Further, in 
the present case Utah's long-arm statute14 is controlling. Under 
our statute Utah cannot assert long-arm jurisdiction over Plaintiff 
unless he committed in Utah "an act giving rise to [Defendant's] 
claim." 
Plaintiff has committed no acts in Utah. 
Defendant also cites15 In re Hazen and Henderson, 702 P. 2d 
1143 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) , but that case is obviously and 
immediately distinguishable on its facts because therein both 
parties moved from the marital state with the mother and child 
going to Oregon and the father going to Ohio. The Oregon court 
sustained personal jurisdiction over the father because, inter 
alia, he visited the child in Oregon. The Hazen court 
distinguished the facts therein from the facts in Kulko by saying: 
This [Hazen] case is factually distinguishable from 
Kulko. There, the husband wanted the issues litigated 
in New York, the state of the marital domicile and the 
place where the separation agreement had been executed. 
See page 10 above. 
15
 Appellant's brief, p. 13. 
15 
There was no evidence that the husband had visited the 
children in California, 
Contact 4:16 Defendant claims that Plaintiff is obligated to 
pay certain medical and health-care expenses for the minor 
children, and that Plaintiff's failure to pay said expenses "could" 
impact local health-care providers. 
That claim does not constitute a contact with the State of 
Utaho What "could" happen and what has happened are two entirely 
different things; what "could" happen is purely speculative and 
only amounts, at best, to a "pre-contact" — not an actual contact. 
Contact 5:17 Defendant claims that Plaintiff has been paying 
child support directly to Defendant and is current in his payments 
and that no claim for arrearage has been made. 
That claim has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a contact 
with Utah. If Defendant's argument was held to establish that 
Plaintiff has a sufficient contact with Utah, it would have a 
chilling effect on support payments to Utah families by non-
resident fathers. Public policy mandates that payment of child 
support by a non-resident not be considered as a minimum contact 
Appellant's Brief, p. 11. 
16 
sufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction over the non-resident 
payor. 
Contact 6:18 Defendant claims that Plaintiff has court-ordered 
visitation rights with the minor children and that it "can 
reasonably be expected" that he will visit them in Utah. 
That claim has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a contact 
with Utah. First of all, he has not visited the children in Utah. 
As discussed above, Plaintiff has never visited anyone in Utah. 
What he might do in the future is purely speculative, and does not 
constitute a "contact" with Utah. 
Defendant further claims that Plaintiff will be required to 
pay the childrens' transportation from Salt Lake City to Roswell, 
New Mexico. That claim has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a 
contact with Utah. 
Contact 7:19 Defendant claims that the parties are obligated 
to keep each other informed concerning the children which "could" 
result in interstate communication initiated by Plaintiff to the 
State of Utah via telephone or mail. 
18
 id . 
19
 Id. 
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Many courts have rejected the argument that interstate 
telephone communications and/or mail constitute a basis for 
invoking personal jurisdiction against a non-resident of the forum 
state* See generally Gagner v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 450 
F.Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 
F.2d 77, 79 (7th Cir. 1981); and Blue Ball Properties, Inc., v. 
McClain, 658 F.Supp. 1310 (D. Del. 1987). 
Furthermoref what Plaintiff might do in the future is purely 
speculative and does not constitute a "contact" with Utah. To say 
that Plaintiff might call Defendant on the phone while Defendant 
resides in Utah does not mean that he will "purposely avail himself 
of the privilege of conducting activities within [Utah]" or that 
he will thereby "[invoke] the benefit and protection of its laws." 
Hanson, 375 U.S. 235 (1958). Furthermore, Utah public policy 
dictates that a non-resident father should remain in contact with 
his children via the telephone and interstate mails without the 
risk of being brought into Utah for post-divorce proceedings. 
4. THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT DOES NOT APPLY 
IN THE PRESENT CASE TO PROVIDE UTAH A BASIS FOR 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF. 
Defendant's final argument in POINT I of her Brief (p. 15) is 
that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, as interpreted by Bradford v. 
18 
Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988), establishes a basis for personal 
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff in the present case. 
As Plaintiff reviews the Bradford case, he can find absolutely 
nothing therein to support Defendant's position. Defendant's 
reliance on Bradford is an error. 
While it is true that Defendant has a New Mexico judgment that 
she wants to modify in Utah against her non-resident ex-husband, 
she fails to recognize that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act is not 
designed for that purpose. Rather, the Act is designed to assist 
non-resident judgment holders in collecting their judgments against 
Utah residents. 
In Bradford, a default judgment was taken by Mississippi 
residents against a Utah resident in a Mississippi court. When the 
Mississippi residents attempted to enforce their judgment against 
the Utah resident in Utah, a Utah district court vacated the 
Mississippi default judgment. On appeal, it was found that even 
though the Utah resident had some contacts with Mississippi, such 
contacts "were insufficient under the due process clause to support 
that state's exercise of personal jurisdiction." Id. 
Bradford appears to support Plaintiff's position on appeal; 
it does not support Defendant's position. 
Due process requires that before a court can 
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over 
a nonresident defendant, the defendant must 
19 
have purposefully established minimum contacts 
with the forum state." Id. 
In the present case, Plaintiff has had no contacts with Utah. 
While a foreign judgment filed in Utah "is treated in all respects 
like a judgment of the district court of Utah and is therefore 
• • • • 20 • 
subject to being vacated and set aside in a like manner," that is 
not factually equivalent to the present case. 
In the present case, a Utah resident filed a foreign judgment 
in Utah and then filed a petition to modify it. Defendant seeks 
to impose alimony and increase child support against a non-
resident. 
Further, the "Full Faith and Credit" clause only applies to 
enforcement of judgments and is not to be taken to require a court 
in a second state to give more force and effect to a judgment than 
the judgment would have in the courts in the state in which it was 
rendered. 
Defendant appears to take the position that she can utilize 
the Foreign Judgment Act for the purpose of imposing "new"21 
financial obligations against Plaintiff even though Utah does not 
have personal jurisdiction over him. The error in Defendant's 
See footnote 2 herein. 
20 
reasoning is found by looking at the purpose of the Foreign 
Judgment Act which is to enable non-residents to utilize Utah 
courts to "enforce" the orders and judgments of sister-state courts 
against Utah residents. Clearly, Plaintiff's reliance on the Act 
is not to "enforce" the New Mexico decree; she wants to impose 
"new" financial obligations on Plaintiff which his home state of 
New Mexico did not order, and which Utah may not order because of 
the lack of personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff. 
5. PLAINTIFF, NOT DEFENDANT, IS ENTITLED TO AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Defendant cites Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 
(1952) to encourage the Court of Appeals to award her attorney's 
fees against Plaintiff. 
Stuber has nothing to do with the granting of attorney's fees 
on appeal. In Stuber, the Supreme Court merely recognized that the 
trial court's award of attorney's fees was appropriate where the 
husband's income was higher than the wife's and where the husband's 
failure to abide by the divorce decree had forced the wife to 
commence her post-divorce action. .Id. 244 P.2d at 652. 
The facts in Stuber (relating to the award of attorney's fees) 
are not found in the present case. 
21 
As to Plaintiff's right to attorney's fees from Defendant on 
appeal, Plaintiff does not believe that this appeal has been 
initiated in good faith for the reason that Defendant has not 
presented a plausible position. Plaintiff can only conclude that 
Defendant's motive has been to "wear down" Plaintiff's resolve and, 
thereby, motivate Plaintiff to submit to Utah's jurisdiction. 
Obviously, Defendant, as a new-resident of Utah, can carry on her 
legal maneuvers against Plaintiff more economically on her Utah 
turf than she can by returning to New Mexico to do so. 
Based upon Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1988), Defendant should 
be required to pay the attorney's fees and costs incurred by 
Plaintiff in this appeal and in the proceedings before the Third 
District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court ruling was correct and for the foregoing 
reasons the dismissal of the Defendant's claims should be upheld 
and costs and attorney fees awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1988). 
DATED this 1st day of July, 1989. 
/ . - • • . 
Randall J. Holmgren 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
22 
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Randall J. Holmgren 
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ADDENDUM 
24 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
i U The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
ail e\traordinaiy writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal aajudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court, 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record m criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony, 
(0 appeals from district court in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
tiaordinary writs involving a criminal convic-
tion, except those involving a first degree-or capi-
tal felony, 
(h) appeals from district court involving do-
mestic relations cases, including but not limited 
to divorce, annulment property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and pater-
nity, 
(1) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and 
0) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court, may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings 1988 
FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT 
Section 
78-22a-l Short title 
7S 22a-2 Definition — Filing and status of foreign 
judgments 
7S-22a-3 Notice of filing 
78-22a-4 Stay 
7S-22a-5 Lien 
78-22a-6 Optional procedure 
7S-22a-7 Fees 
78-22a-8 Uniformity of interpretation 
78-22a-l. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as 
the "Utah Foreign Judgment Act" 1983 
7S-22a-2. Definition — Filing and status of for-
eign judgments. 
(1) For purposes of this chapter, "foreign judg-
ment" means any judgment, decree, or order of a 
court of the United States or of any other court whose 
acts are entitled to full faith and credit in this state 
(2) A cony of a foreign judgment authenticated in 
accordance with an appropriate act of Congress or an 
appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the county 
clerk of any county in Utah The clerk of the district 
court shall treat the foreign judgment in all respects 
as a judgment of a district court of Utah A judgment 
filed under this chapter has the same effect and is 
subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceed-
ings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying, 
as a judgment of a distnct court of this state and is 
subject to enforcement and satisfaction in like man-
ner. 1983 
78-22a-3. Notice of filing. 
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the credi-
tor, at the tune of filing a foreign judgment, shall file 
an affidavit with the clerk of the district court stating 
the last known post-office address of the judgment 
debtor and the judgment creditor 
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and afii 
davit, the clerk of the district court shall notify the 
judgment debtor that the judgment has been filed 
Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the affi-
davit The clerk shall record the date the notice is 
mailed in the register of actions The notice shall in-
clude the name and post-office address of the judg-
ment creditor and the name and address of the judg-
ment creditor's attorney, if any 
(3) No execution or other process for the enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment filed under this chapter 
nay issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed 
(1) If an appeal from a foreign judgment is pend-
ing, the time for appeal has not expired, or a stay of 
execution has been granted, the court, upon proof 
that the judgment debtor has furnished security for 
satisfaction of the judgment in the state in which the 
judgment was rendered shall stay enforcement of the 
judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for 
appeal expires, or until the stay of execution expires 
or is vacated 
(2) If the foreign judgment debtor, upon motion, 
shows the district court any ground upon which en-
forcement of a judgment of a distnct court of this 
state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforce-
ment of the foreign judgment upon the posting of se-
curity in the kind and amount required to stay en-
forcement of a domestic judgment 1983 
78-22a-5. Lien. 
(1) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter be-
comes a hen as provided in Section 78-22-1 if a stay of 
execution has not been granted 
(2) If the requirements of this chapter are satisfied, 
the foreign judgment becomes a hen upon the judg-
ment debtor's property on the date it is docketed 
1986 
78-22a-6. Optional procedure. 
This chapter shall not be construed to impair a 
judgment creditor's right to bring an action in this 
state to enforce such creditor's judgment. 1983 
78-22a-7. Fees. 
Fees for docketing, transcription, and other en-
forcement proceedings with respect to foreign judg-
ments shall be as provided m Sections 21-2-2, 21-2-3, 
and 21-2-4 1963 
78-22a-8. Uniformity of interpretation. 
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the 
general purpose to make uniform the law of those 
states which enact it 1983 
1966 
78-22a-4. Stay. 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts 
submitting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who 
in person or through an agent doeb any of the follow-
ing enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an indi-
vidual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from 
(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state, 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state, 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty, 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any 
real estate situated in this state, 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, 
or risk located within this state at the time of 
contracting, 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in 
the marital relationship, within this state not-
withstanding subsequent departure from the 
state, or the commission in this state of the act 
giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not 
a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence 
over which the defendent had no control, or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse 
within this state which gives rise to a paternity 
suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78, to determine 
paternity for the purpose of establishing respon-
sibility for child support. 1987 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action 
or defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reason-
able attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith, except under Subsection (2) 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees 
or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), 
but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity m the action before the court, or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for 
not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsec-
tion (1). 1988 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND 
ORDERS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. As defined and pro-
\ided b\ la\s an appeal ma\ be taken from the final orders and judgments of a 
district court juvenile coui t, oi circuit court to the Court of Appeals by filing a 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is 
raken within the time allowed b> Rule 4 Failure of an appellant to take any 
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the Court of 
Appeals deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or 
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or an order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or join in an appeal of 
another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal Such joint appeals 
may thereafter proceed and be treated as a single appeal with a single appel-
lant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the Court of Appeals 
on its own motion, on motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent The title of the action 
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the Court of Appeals In original proceedings m the 
Court of Appeals, the party making the original application shall be known as 
the plaintiff and any other party as the defendant 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal, shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from, shall name the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate that the appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals. 
